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SELF-REGULATION IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY*
RICHARD A. BOOTH**
"Self-regulation" sounds at first like self-contradiction.
No doubt to many it is a concept more sinister than amus-
ing. Whether it is employed by doctors, lawyers, account-
ants or securities and commodities firms, many will regard
it with suspicion because it is not only blatantly elitist, but
it is also subject to obvious abuse: what is to keep the self-
regulated from setting up self-serving rules and giving
themselves the benefit of the doubt every time someone
complains? On the other hand, self-regulation suits the
national temperment. Americans tend to be skeptical of
regulations and authority. Generally, we prefer private
action to government action, though we quickly become
suspicious of private power too.' Thus, if self-regulation
is valid and workable, it is important to know why and
how it works, not only to dispel our natural doubts but
also because such a system may well be of wider use in a
free enterprise economy, where so many decisions escape
direct regulation.
The answers to the questions of why and how self-regu-
lation works are not obvious. The best place to look for
them, though, may be the securities industry. Self-regula-
tion has been scrutinized more in this industry than any
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I See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, 96TH CONG.,
2D SESS. STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE AcCOUNTABILITY 227-325 (1980) (collect-
ing an impressive array of legal and non-legal sources on these propositions).
492 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [50
other, perhaps because it was consciously imposed by acts
of Congress in an admitted effort to turn the business into
a "profession." Such a conversion, imposed from with-
out, in a business so much in the public eye, and sporting
so poor a reputation, provides a useful case study.
I. THE ORIGINS OF SELF-REGULATION IN THE SECURITIES
INDUSTRY
Self-regulation in the securities business is most easily
understood in connection with dealings in over-the-
counter (OTC) stocks.2 The Securities Exchange Act of
19343 originally conferred upon the SEC the power to
regulate OTC business practices directly.4 It was
amended, however, in 1936 to require registration with
the SEC of all broker-dealers and to provide for sanctions
against a broker-dealer found guilty of any of several of-
fenses. 5 The 1936 amendment withdrew the Commis-
sion's power to establish any standards of practice, largely
because the OTC business was poorly understood and to-
tally unorganized. 6
It soon became apparent, however, that monitoring the
performance of broker-dealers even once registered was
more than the Commission could handle.7 Undoubtedly,
too, the requirements of due process in disciplinary pro-
ceedings contributed to delays and added to the SEC's
2 The over-the-counter market differs from an exchange or auction market
(such as the New York Stock Exchange) in that transactions typically occur be-
tween a customer and a broker-dealer acting as principal. Rather than relying on
buyers and sellers to meet each other at a central place, in the OTC market a
broker-dealer acts as a market maker and publishes the prices at which he will buy
and sell a security. For stocks which are not frequently traded (of which there are
many) there is no alternative to this type of market. For a more thorough descrip-
tion of the OTC market, see Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at
the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 894-96 (1982). See also
Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence on Corporate and Securities Regulation,
73 YALE L.J. 920, 947-48 (1964).
5 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1982).
6 Jennings, supra note 4, at 947-48.
7Id.
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work load. Moreover, it must have been clear that the
Commission, constrained by the necessity of specifying
grounds for enforcement, did not have sufficient flexibil-
ity to prosecute new forms of fraud or to impose new
business practices, and would therefore follow rather than
lead the development of the industry.' Yet, it must also
have been apparent that the securities industry required
some outside agency to establish goals for it.9 The prob-
lem was that government could not know what would
work or, even if it did, force it upon an unwilling industry.
Thus, in 1938, Congress passed the Maloney Act, ad-
ding section 15A to the 1934 Act. 10 The Maloney Act was
conceived not as a means of imposing business practice
regulation, but rather as a means of inducing those in the
business to regulate themselves. Former SEC Chairman
William 0. Douglas explained the idea of self-regulation:
From the broad public viewpoint, such regulation can be
far more effective [than direct regulation] . . . . Self-regu-
lation. . . can be pervasive and subtle in its conditioning
influence over business practices and business morality.
8 This problem continues to plague the SEC to an extent. For example, the
Commission has long desired to eradicate abusive "boiler rooms" (broker-dealers
who use high pressure telephone sales tactics to sell one or a few low priced spec-
ulative issues) but has hesitated to outlaw such operations by a general rule. See
Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1963); Kahn v. SEC, 297 F.2d 112 (2d Cir.
1961); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,195 (Jan. 21, 1977); Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 20,943 (May 9, 1984) (proposing and reproposing a
definiton of broker-dealer for purposes of Section 15 registration requirement).
The apparent reason for the SEC's reluctance to promulgate a definite rule is that
some securities are too risky for broker-dealers to handle profitably within the
NASD's mark-up and underwriting discount guidelines. See, e.g., Alstead, Demp-
sey & Co., 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 723 (Apr. 27, 1984); Norris & Hirshberg
v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949). One solution, of course, would be to rely
on the SEC's discretion to prosecute only abusive boiler room operators, but the
United States Supreme Court appears to take a dim view of that alternative. As
the Court put it, "[w]ithout legal limitations, market participants are forced to rely
on the reasonableness of the SEC's litigation strategy, but that can be hazard-
ous. . .. ." SEC v. Dirks, 463 U.S. 646 n.24 (1983). But see Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (exchange could not prohibit members from
dealing with non-member without according non-member minimal due process
protections).
9 See Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755 (1984).
,o 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1982).
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By and large, government can operate satisfactorily only
by proscription. That leaves untouched large areas of
conduct and activity; some of it susceptible of government
regulation but in fact too minute for satisfactory control;
some of it lying beyond the periphery of the law in the
realm of ethics and morality. Into these large areas self-
government, and self-government alone, can effectively
reach. For these reasons such self-regulation is by far the
preferable course from all viewpoints. I '
Essentially, the Maloney Act provides for the registra-
tion of an organization of broker-dealers as a "national
securities association."' 12 In order to register, the Act re-
quires that such an association have rules providing for
the discipline of members and the promotion of just and
equitable principles of trade.' 3 The Commission reserves
the right to review, and even change, the rules proposed
by the organization and to hear appeals from disciplinary
orders. 14 As an inducement to join the organization, the
organization's rules may provide that members can deal
with non-members only at rates available to the general
public. 15 Thus, by being a member of such an organiza-
tion one may receive certain discounts.' 6 The Act also
suggests that the organization may engage in a limited
amount of restraint of trade if it is appropriate to the fur-
therance of the goals of securities regulation. 17 The Ma-
l Address by SEC Chairman William 0. Douglas, quoted in Jennings, Self-Reg-
ulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 663, 678 (1964).
21 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(a) (1982).
,3 Id. § 78o-3(b).
4 Id. § 78s.
15 Id. § 78o-3(e).
16 The ability to give and receive discounts is much more than a perquisite in
the securities industry: as a practical matter new issues of securities could not
otherwise be sold at fixed prices and secondary trading would be impaired by the
customer's having to seek out a market maker or pay an additional markup or
commission to an introducing broker. See supra note 2; Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 15,807 (May 9, 1979). Oddly enough the rule has proven somewhat
difficult to enforce in connection with new issues because institutional investors
have pressured broker- dealers to pass on some of the discount. Id.
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o-3(b)(6),(7) (1982). See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,
373 U.S. 341 (1963); Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659 (1975).
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loney Act states quite clearly, though, that such an
organization must take its disciplinary role seriously or
lose these potential benefits.' 8
Only one organization, the National Association of Se-
curities Dealers (NASD), has ever registered.' 9 In theory
any number of organizations could have qualified,
although it must have been apparent, even as the Act was
passed, that potential benefits such as discounts and fixed
fee schedules would be maximized if fewer organizations
registered.
The result is thus not surprising, but the scheme can
begin to look like a ruse. Viewed cynically, it is clear that
Congress found in the Maloney Act a means of delegating
its own regulatory authority, not to a government agency
with commissioners ultimately accountable to the body
politic, but rather to the industry itself. On its face the
Maloney Act appears to give quasi-governmental author-
ity to a self-selected and possibly self-perpetuating elite.
If the affairs to be regulated are of legitimate interest to
the government, one must ask how this delegation can be
justified.
It is no answer that the NASD is subject to SEC supervi-
sion. The NASD has real authority, often exercised with-
out interference from the SEC and sometimes used
through disciplinary proceedings to deprive people of
their livelihood. 0 It may have been out of sensitivity to
such arguments that at the time the Maloney Act was
passed, the possibility of requiring broker-dealers to join
was rejected. Indeed forced membership could have
threatened the constitutionality of the scheme. 2 1 As en-
acted, the Maloney Act would allow the SEC to argue that
the organization was voluntary. 22 Nevertheless, broker-
18 See 15 U.S.C. 78o-3(b) (1982).
19 Jennings, supra note 4, at 949-50.
20 15 U.S.C. 78o-3(b)(7) (1982).
21 See generally Jennings, supra note 4.
22 See id. at 949. The idea of mandatory membership was, however, resurrected
and again rejected in 1964, apparently because of opposition from mutual funds
whose dealers would have been required to join. Instead, the SEC was empow-
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dealers were effectively threatened into joining the NASD:
it was surely clear that failure to join meant regulation by
the possibly stricter SEC. Still worse, once the SEC had
been freed from supervising all broker-dealers it could
concentrate precisely on those who had refused to join.
Although the Maloney Act was an innovation, it was not
the first attempt to impose self-regulation. From the be-
ginning the Exchange Act depended upon the stock ex-
changes to act as disciplinary agencies for their
members. 23 Perhaps because the exchanges already ex-
isted, had defined membership and were important forces
in interstate commerce, it did not seem odd to grant them
the equivalent of governmental authority, even if one re-
garded them as private clubs. 24 Yet one's comfort with
self-regulation is perhaps threatened by the realization
that whether the organization or the authority comes first
should make no difference. It seems more peculiar that
an organization of immense national importance such as
the New York Stock Exchange was ever unregulated, or was
left to such a curious scheme of control as self-regulation
appears to be.25
While the constitutionality of self-regulation could be
discussed at length, the objective here is to offer a theory
that resolves the apparent contradiction between this par-
ticular form of self-regulation and notions of representa-
tive democracy.
ered to set up a parallel regulatory scheme (known as SECO for "SEC Only") for
broker dealers who chose not to join the NASD. See L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 692-93 (1983). Finally in 1983, all broker-dealers were
required to join the NASD. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(8)(9),
15 U.S.C. § 78o (1984); 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess., 597-98 (1983).
23 Securities Exchange Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1984).
24 See Jennings, supra note 11, at 667. See also Gordon v. New York Stock Ex-
change, 422 U.S. 659, 664 (1975); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373, U.S.
341, 348 (1963); Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 239 (2d Cir. 1944).
2- For one answer, see J. K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 119-20
(1967). Somewhat contrary to the view expressed here, Gaibraith sees the econ-
omy as in fact regulated by the bureacracy of business and thus advocates greater
government intervention in the planning process.
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II. SELF-REGULATION AND RULE DEVELOPMENT
Certainly the ends of the Maloney Act are quite lauda-
ble. As one court stated:
From the concept of cooperative (industry-government)
regulation developed in the National Recovery Adminis-
tration was born the organizattion of the [NASD] which, it
was hoped, would provide . . . for the development and
enforcement of high professional standards within the
ranks of brokers and dealers . . . . Then Chairman of the
SEC, William 0. Douglas, outlined the twin objectives of
[the] NASD . . . when he stated that [it] would bring
about voluntary self-discipline in conformity to the law
and would also encourage obedience to ethical standards
beyond those which any law could establish. . . . Thus
self-regulation was to encompass more than simple illegal-
ity. Guiding the broker-dealer to do that which is right
and fair was to be as much a goal of cooperative self-regu-
lation as was condemning that which is wrong and unfair.
Rules, example, and professional banishment were to be
used to attain the former, while the jailhouse was to be
used to stamp out the latter.26
Undoubtedly it was hoped that the industry itself would
impose more stringent rules than the SEC in an effort to
keep the SEC away, and that enforcement methods largely
freed from the strictures of due process would ferret out
the worst offenders more quickly. At the very least, indi-
viduals might use a little self-restraint rather than risk de-
tection. The risk, of course, was that of foxes guarding
the chicken coop.
The actual result has been something in between. For
example, in 1942 the SEC proposed that confirmations of
OTC purchases state the best independent quotations for
the stock available at the time of the transaction.2 7 The
NASD opposed the rule, possibly because of the unrelia-
26 Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1378-79 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
27 RATNER, Regulation of the Compensation of Securities Dealers, 55 CORNELL L. REV.
348, 370-74 (1970). See also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION
579-80 (5th ed. 1982). Since these were "dealer" transactions with technically no
agency relationship with the customer, there was no common law requirement
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bility inherent in some quotations, the time required to_
thoroughly compare them, or because of a general reluc-
tance to disclose markups to customers who may not have
known they were paying a mark-up.28
In response, the NASD surveyed its members to deter-
mine typical mark-ups. Discovering that 71% of sales
were made at a mark-up of 5% or less, the NASD issued
an interpretation of its rules stating that any mark-up in
excess of 5% would be regarded as unfair. The SEC was
apparently satisfied and did not raise the matter again for
twenty years.29
In 1962 the SEC proposed that all OTC transactions be
performed on an agency basis unless the stock was already
in a dealer's inventory. Again, the idea was to force dis-
closure of mark-ups by turning them into commissions.
This time the NASD responded that members would be
forced out of dealing in OTC stocks because the New
York Stock Exchange commission rate would be effec-
tively imposed on all transactions. The SEC acquiesced,
but by 1966 there had been a marked increase in agency
transactions (from 50% to 66% of all OTC trades)."
Finally in 1978, the SEC amended its rules to require
disclosure of mark-ups in any transaction in which a bro-
ker-dealer - acting as principal - himself went to market
to fill a customer's order, but it withdrew a proposed rule
similar to the one proposed in 1942. The NASD this time
around argued that the mark-up rule, the best execution
rule and the public availability of quotations made the
proposed rule unnecessary." Moreover, the NASD ar-
gued that the SEC's rule would have been difficult to en-
that a "commission" be disclosed. But see U.C.C. § 8-319 (1976) (buyer of securi-
ties may repudiate transaction within ten days of receipt of confirmation).
28 Ratner, supra note 27, at 371.
29 Id. at 374.
3o Id. at 373.
51 The best execution rule requires a broker-dealer to obtain the best price
available at the time. Execution of Retail Transactions in the Over-The Counter
market, NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2151.03 (effective May 1, 1982) (interpretation
of the NASD Board of Governors).
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force and too expensive.32 Whether the latter is true
(especially in an age of computers), the end result was to
place enough information in the hands of the customer to
allow a rough derivation of the information the SEC had
desired to be disclosed."
32 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,214, [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
81,746 (Oct. 6, 1978) (adopting Sec. Exch. Act Rule lOb-10).
3 Interestingly, Rule lOb-10 fails to require the disclosure of mark-ups in only
one circumstance, viz., where the sale (or purchase) is made from (or to) the bro-
ker-dealer's inventory. Arguably, that is the only situation in which such informa-
tion is material. See Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970).
See also R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 27, at 580-82 (questioning need for
disclosure of market maker status). Very nearly all of the controversies that have
arisen in connection with market regulation since 1934 can be characterized as
involving the omnipresent conflict of interest generated by the fact that brokers
and dealers are one in the same. As brokers they supposedly act as agent for the
customer. As dealers they are themselves principals dealing with their customers.
In 1934 Congress instructed the SEC to study the feasibility of separating the two
functions (both in the OTC market and on the exchanges where specialist firms
act as dealers and in effect make a market in stocks which are temporarily inac-
tive). The Commission issued its report in 1936, concluding that this inherent
conflict should be "managed" by the adoption of particularized rules regulating
it. See SEC, Report on the Feasibility and Advisability of the Complete Segregation of the
Functions of Dealer and Broker (1936).
This conclusion may well have been prompted by the recognition that securities
of the smallest, newest, most speculative companies could not be marketed with-
out some positive selling effort and that unless a unifed broker-dealer was allowed
to play both ends against the middle his return would not be sufficient to facilitate
distribution and trading. Conceptually, this theory fits nicely with the delegation
of substantive regulation of mark-ups to the NASD: in effect the choice was to
allow the industry to exploit a regulated conflict of interest in exchange for hold-
ing down the return a broker-dealer could enjoy. The explanation may be ex-
tended to NASD supervision of discounts in connection with initial public
offerings. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 512-22 (5th ed.
1982). The fact that this conflict was sanctioned also may have led to passage of
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 806. and its relatively strict
interpretation subsequently. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S.
180 (1963). Perhaps it was thought that since broker-dealers could not be ele-
vated to investors' agents, some separate class of market professionals that could
be so depended on should be created. This may also explain why the Investment
Advisers Act prohibits purely performance-based compensation: allowing such
compensation would attract higher-risk advisers motivated by contingent fees and
possibly somewhat reluctant to advise clients to sell in order to avoid losses.
There has recently been some discussion of allowing performance-based fees
however. See 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) (May 11, 1984) (reporting Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 911, May 2, 1984, withdrawing proposed rule to allow
performance-based compensation). Despite the Act and its interpretation, invest-
ment advisers also face considerable conflicts of interest. For one, they are gener-
ally very reluctant to advise that a particular stock be sold because they may be
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In effect the SEC got everything except what it wanted.
The industry, however, was privileged to choose its
poison and could not have been heard to complain that
government rules, established without regard to business
realities, were interfering. It may have been that the SEC
rule would not have worked as well. If an industry de-
vised rule meets the need, implementation is bound to be
easier, since those assigned the task have not lost face and
have no incentive to find the faults of the scheme. In-
deed, they have every incentive to make it work.
In the absence of self-regulation, an agency, simply in
the course of doing its job, will raise issues again and
again as the SEC did in 1942, 1962 and 1978. After all,
the agency staff is paid to raise issues. A self-regulatory
organization (with a counter-balancing insititutional
memory) can monitor such repetition, stave it off when
too frequent, or revise its own rules to fit the repeatedly
questioned practices. While it may be said that self-regu-
lation is a way of avoiding regulation, one can also argue
that any regulated industry needs an advocate to avoid the
disruption of changing conventions too rapidly or more
often than is consistent with its continued healthy
functioning.
In the final analysis, perhaps the best test for the pro-
priety of government regulation versus self-regulation is
whether the matter in question may be handled by pro-
scription as then SEC Chairman Douglas suggested. 4
One possible way of identifying situations appropriate to
self-regulation is by determining whether there is more
than one acceptable outcome (as it appears there was with
regard to dealer transactions). In such situations, insiders
denied access to management or may lose underwriting business for their firm.
Moreover, if the market is efficient investment advice is virtually worthless. In-
deed evidence indicates that even the best advised investors (e.g., mutual funds)
cannot consistently beat the market. See J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK
MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE (1973); Note, Broker Investment Recommendations
and the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis: A Proposed Cautionary Legend, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 1077 (1977).
14 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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may be better able to choose among alternative
solutions.35
III. CIVIL LIABILITY AND SELF-REGULATION
One of the most important issues regarding self-regula-
tion is whether a customer can sue for a violation of an
industry-imposed rule. The answer greatly affects public
perception and pressure for greater outside regulation.
If one cannot sue, the public is likely to think self-regula-
tion is mere window dressing: an effort to create the aura
of professionalism and with it, ironically, immunity from
responsibility.
If suit is allowed, however, the profession itself will be
reluctant to set high standards. Moreover, the threat of
legal action may encourage excessively precise standards
in order to make technical compliance easier. Innovation
may be discouraged because even an experimental change
in rules or alteration of business practice might be per-
ceived as reflecting accepted practice. In short, raising
self-regulation to the level of law, rather than recognizing
3- The distinction is analogous to the rationale behind the business judgment
rule in corporation law. See Booth, The Business Purpose Doctrine and the Limits of
Equal Treatment in Corporation Law, 38 Sw. LJ. 853, 877-79 (1984). One may think
of the NASD as itself in the business (or meta-business) of developing and im-
proving systems of non-exchange trading rather than as a cartel of broker-dealers,
and it would not be surprising to find that other industries in which inter-firm
dealings and conventions are particularly important have similarly strong self-reg-
ulatory organizations ("SROs") or could benefit from the cost savings an SRO
could achieve.
Regarding the notion that the NASD is a meta-business, there is substantial
evidence that it competes vigorously with the exchanges for listing. See, e.g., SEC
Approves NASD Proposal to Expand National Trading System for OTC Stocks, 16 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1828 (Nov. 23, 1984). Such competition is nowhere more
evident than in connection with the ongoing development of the National Market
System. See R. SOBEL, INSIDE WALL STREET 67, 115 (1977); Seligman, The Future of
the National Market System, 10 J. CORP. L. 79 (1984); Poser, Restructuring the Stock
Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883
(1982); Werner, Adventure in Social Control of Finance: The National Market System for
Securities, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1233 (1975); Competition with the exchanges, in
addition to supervision by the SEC, may be quite effective in keeping the NASD
honest. On the other hand, competition with the exchanges probably does not
temper the authority of the NASD as exercised against the smallest broker-
dealers.
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its unique value, encourages setting a minimum standard
of behavior rather than expressing a goal or a possibly un-
attainable maximum.3 6
The issue whether to allow private law suits for viola-
tions of the rules of a self-regulatory organizaion ("SRO")
is quite alive in the securities industry. It often arises in
connection with the NASD's "suitability rule," which re-
quires that a recommendation regarding a security bear
some relationship to the needs of the customer.3 ' The
rule is not supposed to be insurance against errors in
judgment, but rather is meant as a representation, based
on the expertise of the broker-dealer, that there is some-
thing more to a recommended stock than the commission
he will receive. 8
Given the quasi-legal status of the NASD, it is not sur-
prising that a customer whose investment has turned sour
will argue it was "unsuitable" and will cite the rule. Few
courts have allowed recovery on this basis alone 9.3  How-
36 See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 181 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 166 n.23 (3d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
17 NASD, Rules of Fair Practice Art. III, § 2 provides:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of
any security a member shall have reasonable grounds for believing
that the recommendation is suitable for such customer upon the ba-
sis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to his other
security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs.
A similar rule stated in the negative was adopted under the SECO system. The
NYSE "Know Your Customer" Rule (Rule 405) is similar but arguably broader.
See Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 141 (7th
Cir. 1969)); see also Lange v. Hentz & Co., 418 F.Supp. 1376, 1381 (N.D. Tex.
1976) (NASD rules are designed primarily to protect NASD members and only
incidentally protect customers).
38 Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine,
1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 448. The suitability rule (focusing on the characteristics of
the investor) works in tandem with the reasonable basis requirement (focusing on
characteristics of the investment). See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
See also Bines, Setting Investment Objectives: The Suitability Doctrine Pts. 1 & 2, 4 SEC.
REG. LJ. 276, 418 (1976).
39 See Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677, 678 (9th Cir. 1980). See also
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1039 (1978) (dissenting opinion of Judge Mansfield); Landy v. FDIC, 486
F.2d 139, 166 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960, (1974); Plunkett v. Domi-
nick & Dominick, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 885, 889 (D. Conn. 1976);Jenny v. Shearson,
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ever, in the words of one state court:
It may be asserted that the proposed guidelines are merely
ethical standards and should not be a predicate for civil
liability. Good ethics should not be ignored by the law. It
would be inconsistent to suggest that a person should be
defrocked as a member of his calling, and yet not be liable
for the injury which resulted from his acts or omissions. 40
Does a civil remedy so clearly follow from the possibil-
ity of "defrocking"? Not necessarily. While a civil rem-
edy may make the customer whole, in the long run the
judicial definition of "suitable" would be so elusive as
either to be hollow or an absolute guaranty against declin-
ing stock prices. On the other hand, disciplinary proceed-
ings are a genuine sanction. The remedy and indeed the
proceeding itself are sufficiently drastic to create a sub-
stantial incentive for self-restraint. Indeed, disciplinary
proceedings tend to occur somewhat unpredictably and
tend to generate more circumspect behavior on the part
of the SRO members.4'
Moreover, a court of law must strain to devise an appro-
priate remedy which encourages self-restraint but does
not invite excessive litigation. Courts may well be incapa-
ble of reaching such a balance. For example, in Miley v.
Oppenheimer & Co. 42 the court, in allowing recovery in a
"churning" (excessive trading) case, recognized that mere
Hammill & Co., [1974-75] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,021 at 97,582 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). In each of these cases the court has noted among other things that SRO
rules may be viewed other than as intended primarily for the benefit of investors
which is, of course, a vital factor in the test for whether a private right of action
exists. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975); Touche Ross & Co. v. Reddington,
442 U.S. 560 (1979); Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11
(1979).
-0 Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690; 69
Cal. Rptr. 222, 244 (1968).
4 See Calfee & Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal Stan-
dards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984). Although Justice Holmes said, "[T]he very
meaning of a line in the law is that you intentionally may go as close to it as you
can if you do not pass it..., Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395-
96 (1930), this hardly seems to be the case regarding SRO rules and disciplinary
proceedings.
42 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981).
19851 503
504 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [50
disgorgement of commissions by the broker-dealer would
not discourage repetition. Thus, the court awarded the
plaintiff three times the commission that had been paid in
connection with the unnecessary trading.43 Such a rem-
edy, however, may unduly encourage disappointed inves-
tors to sue. Even if one subscribes to the philosophy that
the securities laws were intended to protect investors,
presumably investors are still expected to bear the risk
that they will lose money.44
By refusing to allow a civil remedy the courts preserve
the ability of self-regulators to set higher standards. A
notable example is Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,45 a case
which arose from the negligent failure of an accounting
firm to discover a mail opening practice which allowed the
president of a securities firm to embezzle certain custom-
ers' funds. The plaintiff argued that if the auditors had
abided by appropriate auditing procedures as set forth by
the profession they would have discovered the fraud. The
Supreme Court refused to recognize a cause of action
based on the auditors' negligent failure to comply with
the profession's established auditing procedures.46
Although it may be argued that accountants play a cen-
tral role in the scheme of federal securities regulation and
that investors are encouraged to rely on them, Hochfelder
has a very sound basis in policy. Accounting rules are
very much like the common law: although codifications
exist, it is generally agreed that the standard is what the
profession does. The profession does not undertake to in-
sure that every similar situation will be similarly treated.
Rather, practice is expected to vary somewhat as auditors
improve their craft. Indeed, the SEC, though apparently
empowered to promulgate its own accounting rules, has
declined to act directly and has instead typically suggested
43 Id. at 332.
44 See Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1053 (1977).
45 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
46 Id. at 206.
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improvements to the profession.47 The substance of this
approach is well illustrated by an SEC release in which the
Commission purported to establish a policy that it would
regard as authoritive only those standards promulgated
by the profession's self-appointed Financial Accounting
Standards Board:
It should be noted that Rule 203 of the Rules of Conduct
of the Code of Ethics of the AICPA [American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants] provides that it is necessary
to depart from accounting principles promulgated by the
body designated by the Council of the AICPA if, due to
unusual circumstances, failure to do so would result in
misleading financial statements. In such a case, the use of
other principles may be accepted or required by the
Commission.4"
This directive is roughly equivalent to saying "follow the
rules unless in your judgment it is better not to."
As with the securities business itself, the SEC seems to
regard detailed rules imposed from without as less effec-
tive than the self-control that can be induced by the threat
of intervention. Although the SEC argued for the losing
side in Hochfelder, had the Hochfelder decision been other-
wise, its greatest impact might well have been to restrain
the innovative quality of standard setting among self-reg-
ulated professionals, including broker-dealers. 4
47 See generally S. SIEGEL & D. SIEGEL, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE,
146-48 (1983); Burton, SEC Enforcement and Professional Accountants: Philosophy,
Objectives and Approach, 28 VAN. L. REV. 19 (1975). The SEC's approach to regula-
tion of the accounting profession has recently come under heavier scrutiny and is
the subject of current hearings in the House Energy and Commerce Oversight
Investigations Subcommittee. 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 346 (Feb. 22, 1985).
48 SEC Accounting Series Release No. 150, 39 Fed. Reg. 1260 n. 2 (1973).
49 It is frequently said that the goal of the federal securities laws is the protec-
tion of investors. While this idea may seem banal it is not even necessarily true.
One need only read Section 1 of the Securities Exchange Act to see that Congress
was at least concerned about the health of the capital markets. Indeed it might be
argued that Congress' concern with investor protection was derived from its con-
cern with capital formation. The SEC has recently become much more conscious
of the latter. See M. Steinberg, CORPORATE INTERNAL AFFAIRS 44-49 (1983) (dis-
cussing, generally with disapproval, new rules regarding smaller offerings and
shelf registration). A similar dispute exists in antitrust law. The obvious rationale
for the antitrust laws is consumer protection, but it also has been argued that
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IV. TARGETS AND REMEDIES
Often it seems that the burdens accompanying the de-
velopment of self-regulation fall disproportionately on
the little guy. Some of the most important principles gov-
erning broker-dealers have been established in adminis-
trative proceedings brought against small firms, while
larger firms tend to be treated more lightly when they are
sued, if ever.50 On occasion this has sparked heated de-
bate within the SEC. 51 While a bigger firm may be ex-
cused because its officers are less able to know, from one
office to the next, of possible violations by its employees,
the bigger firm can also be expected to undertake a bigger
compliance effort appropriate in size and sophistication to
the firm. Again it is possible to view this apparent bias
against smaller firms quite cynically: the big firms run the
self-regulatory organizations and protect themselves first
before seeking to upgrade the industry.
Of course, there is always the threat of direct govern-
ment intervention to keep such behavior in check. Never-
theless, the SEC must ultimately avoid being too harsh
with the powerful firms. The stock market is a centerpiece
of the economy. Its health and smooth functioning re-
flects and in turn induces health (or illness) in the econ-
omy. Much of the nation's wealth is held in the form of
stocks and other types of instruments negotiated through
securities firms. Thus, the machine must continue to run
even while being repaired.
antitrust is legitimately intended to confine the exercise of private economic
power when it might challenge the ultimate authority of government. See Bork,
Bowman, Blake & Jones, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy, 65 CoLUM. L.
REV. 363, 377, 401, 422 (1965). In short, in both areas, the law is legitimately
concerned with the structure of institutions. As is suggested below, however, see
text accompanying note 47, government is more than defensive. It may well be
vital for economic growth for government to formulate general goals.
50 See, e.g, In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 14,149 (1977); D. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION 885-86 (2d
ed. 1980). Similar allegations have been made recently in House of Representa-
tives hearings on regulation of the accounting profession. 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) (Feb. 22, 1985).
5' See Shearson, Hammill & Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7,743
(1965).
SELF-REGULATION
The SEC seems to have realized over the years that its
own essential mission - disclosure of useful information
to investors - depends on the brokerage industry as its
primary vehicle. Unless practices in the industry foster in-
forming investors, few of those carefully crafted periodic
reports or press releases will ever come to the attention of
their intended audience. The process started with the no-
tion that a broker-dealer who hangs out his "shingle"
holds himself out as having expertise and that he impli-
citly warrants that the price he charges for a security is
close to the market price. Thus, the SEC built what is
known as the "shingle theory. ' 52  Broker-dealers were
also found to have acquired fiduciary status by reason of
their customers' reliance on them.53 Having thus built a
"profession" out of whole cloth, the Commission pro-
ceeded to use it to impose a variety of further duties. Se-
curities firms must gather information about companies
whose stock they recommend and about companies for
whom the broker-dealer makes a market but which do not
file periodic reports under the Exchange Act. 54 There are
even cases which arguably stand for the proposition that a
broker-dealer has a duty to keep his customers informed
after an otherwise unobjectionable sale.55
52 See Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943). When I first
heard of the shingle theory while working on an NASD proceeding brought
against a client, I surmised that the phrase related to the curious overlap of disci-
plinary functions in the securities industry much like shingles on a roof. While I
found this image helpful, I soon discovered the phrase acutally refered to a bro-
ker-dealer's "hanging out his shingle" as other professions are said to do. In ret-
rospect I should have realized that nothing quite so colorful as my image was
likely to emanate from the legal mind.
See Norris & Hirshberg v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
See Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969); Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 34,9310, 36 Fed. Reg. 18,641 (Sept. 13, 1971) (promulgating Rule
15c2-1 1).
55 See Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 14, 149 (1977). A recent attempt to extend the theory may be seen in
Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 840-42 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983)
where Judge Wright held that an analyst employed by a broker-dealer acquired a
fiduciary duty by virtue of his profession and that, notwithstanding the fact that he
had acquired non-public information through legitimate investigation, he could
be held liable under Rule lOb-5 for failure to disclose the information prior to
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None of these improvements in the information system
would have been possible unless the industry was self-reg-
ulating, because it is unlikely that a directly regulated in-
dustry could have been forced to do what the securites
industry at least has come to recognize as a responsibility.
Moreover, rules explaining the duty could not have been
devised with sufficient clarity to guide ministerials, or
would have been too vague to withstand legal attack. 6 In
short, the SEC could not do directly what it does
indirectly.
Unless we are willing to contemplate dismantling the
securities industry, it must be admitted that any improve-
ment in the financial markets depends directly on the pri-
vate institutions which compose them and which must
manage the changes. Ultimately, however, we may view
the use of smaller firms as legal guinea pigs as unfair. Af-
ter all, careers are destroyed in the process. It is impor-
tant to keep some perspective, however. If the financial
markets are to be improved and if we are to pursue a pol-
icy of growth, alterations in the pattern of doing business
must be expected. With alterations, particularly those
forced by legal means, someone whose business de-
pended on the newly prohibited activities will suffer.
Though we do not often think about it, the common law
has always embraced the harsh truth that the first person
to commit an illegal act often will have no way of knowing
in advance that his actions were illegal.
Of course all of this could have been different. At some
point the SEC seems to have decided that broker-dealers,
whose business was roughly evenly divided between
agency and principal transactions, should be agents first,
and principals only when unavoidable. The SEC could
have decided oppositely and proceeded to eradicate any
impression that broker-dealers were agents in their cus-
advising his customers to trade on the basis of it. The Supreme Court dismissed
the theory as novel and not raised by the plaintiff SEC. 103 S.Ct. at 3255.
56 See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, (2d Cir.), cert denied,
385 U.S. 817 (1966).
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tomers' minds. In reality, the customers probably had no
expectation one way or the other since they never knew at
the time of placing an order whether it would be executed
by the firm as broker or as dealer.
One might also object that the entire process of
"professionalization" was beyond the authority of the
SEC, which was charged with perfecting disclosure.5 ' How-
ever, the Exchange Act quite clearly speaks to the health
of the markets generally, and, in practice, even absent that
statutory support, disclosure cannot be effected except
through customers' most frequent contact - broker-
dealers.h5
V. LEGALISM AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
This suggests one final point. Innovation in the securi-
ties industry has clearly depended upon the SEC's formu-
lation of goals and the industry's implementation efforts.
In an industry so competitive, in which the innovation it-
self relates to business conventions, one may surmise that
both are necessary parties. This implies not only a re-
sponsibility on the part of the SEC but also a responsibil-
ity on the part of the industry to exercises its self-
regulatory privilege in light of this ultimate justification.
Currently the entire scheme is being tested once again in
the development of the National Market System. The
project is going slowly (and some say being obstructed by
the industry). The ability of the SEC to lead a positive
57 On the SEC's less recognized role as a market regulator, see Werner, The SEC
as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REV. 755 (1984).
58 It is entirely possible that the idea of turning the securities business into a
profession was born of a combination of New Deal moralism and a calculated risk
to confer a modicum of monopoly power on the business (to "fatten it up") in
exchange for the business agreeing to conduct itself in a less risky fashion. Never-
theless, in hindsight it appears that there is an additional public benefit: the en-
hancement of the reputation of broker-dealers has worked in tandem with
mandated disclosure to reduce the costs of information for investors, and thus to
make the markets more efficient and less risky than before. See Gilson & Kraak-
man, The Mechanisms ofMarket Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 613-21, 635-42 (1984).
Cf Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp 1376 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (NASD rule is
primarily intended for the benefit of NASD members).
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project such as this, as opposed to pursuing an enforce-
ment function, has been questioned. 59 Still it is difficult to
see an alternative mode of managing change. Of course,
it is always frustrating to await results when it appears
that it is merely necessary to choose one consistent sys-
tem. It must be kept in mind, however, that there may be
many such systems, and the abilities of both the SEC and
the industry are limited. The SEC is not in a position to
know what will work in practice. The industry is not capa-
ble of predicting what the SEC will find objectionable.
The task is therefore necessarily accomplished a step at a
time.
It is conceivable that one day the market will have been
perfected. Then attitudes and expectations should
change. It will be possible to establish rules with preci-
sion, and people in the industry will be entitled to security
in exchange for compliance. But it is crucial to remember
the inconsistency between that sort of predictability and
any sort of innovation. To put the matter as starkly as
possible: legalism is inconsistent with growth.
This inconsistency is not peculiar to the securities in-
dustry. Though it may sound odd to speak of manufactur-
ers, for example, as self-regulated, clearly those who
decide what goods are to be produced make an important
public decision. Nearly all the productive assets of the
country are in private hands. While the owners may be
prohibited for a good reason from putting them to any
particular use, they cannot be forced to invent new or bet-
ter uses. What a new or better use is cannot fully be de-
scribed to them, and there is no way to put the matter up
to a vote. Indeed the most notable occasion on which a
manufacturer attempted to derive a new product from in-
formation collected about the desires of consumers, the
Edsel episode, was a disaster which seriously weakened
the Ford Motor Company, one of the nation's important
assets.60 More recently, the National Science Foundation
Poser, supra note 2, at 946-51.
For a thorough investigation of the Edsel fiasco from this perspective, see
[50
1985] SELF-REGULATION 511
revealed that it had no means of determining which appli-
cants for grants were most worthy.6' Instances such as
these caution against the belief that formulas, the scien-
tific method, or precisely crafted legal rules may be used
to derive hitherto unknown improvements in any
system. 6
2
Although business in general has toyed with the notion
of professionalism, there is far from any concensus in
favor of it.63 Yet, there is no question that business is self-
regulated. In the case of the Edsel some recognition of
the attendant responsibility would have helped.
Therein lies the essential point of this essay. To the ex-
tent we desire improvement and economic growth, the
law must be restrained: innovation cannot itself be manu-
factured by the interplay of rules - at least not yet. 64 If
DEUTSCH, SELLING THE PEOPLE'S CADILLAC: THE EDSEL AND CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1976); see also Chazen, Greening the Grey Flannel Suit, 86 YALE L.J.
185 (1976) (review of Deutsch).
61 N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1981, at 1, col. 6 (study supervised by National Acad-
emy of Sciences concludes that luck plays as big a role as merit in determining
which scientists get research grants from the National Science Foundation).
6r2 In short, no rule can apply itself. See KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (1962); WITrGENSTEIN, I PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1953). See
also Hutchinson, From Cultural Constructions to Historical Deconstruction, 94 YALE L.J.
209 (1984) (review of WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTION
AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER AND COMMUNITY (1984)).
6s See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 177-
81 (5th ed. abr. 1980) (collecting and abstracting sources on corporate social
responsibility).
- Though the propostion is not uncontroversial, it is generally agreed that eco-
nomic growth is desirable. See generally, P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 742-65 (11 th
ed. 1980). Ultimately one's opinion of self-regulation is dictated by one's belief
about the nature of the human behavior and the human mind. If one believes that
human behavior can be reduced to the predictable interplay of rules - as the
behaviorists, for example, seem to believe - then one probably would find self-
regulation to be somewhat offensive since, at least in theory, the SEC, given
enough time, energy and information could engineer the ideal set of rules. See,
e.g., J.K. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (19 6 7 ); J. HABERMAS, TOWARD A
RATIONAL SOCIETY (1968); J. HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND HUMAN INTERESTS
(1968). The behaviorist thesis that human behavior can ultimately be explained
through the scientific method, is a view that has also been associated with Marx-
ism.
If one is not a behaviorist, and instead subscribes, for example, to Gestalt psy-
chology or phenomenology, one is likely to believe in the wisdom of self-regula-
tion since within such schools of thought perceptions of events are thought to be
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one accepts the theory of self-regulation offered here, it
becomes clear that the self-regulated exercise a privilege
in exchange for taking on a duty. Awareness of that fact
should itself contribute to both self-restraint and the ap-
propriate use of disciplinary actions. In short, we need
not despair of all possibility of control. Self-regulation is
one way innovation may be indirectly regulated without
being destroyed.
CONCLUSION
In the end self-regulation is neither self-contradictory
nor inconsistent with democratic principles. Quite to the
contrary, it complements democracy very nicely in that
political stability depends greatly on economic growth.
Nevertheless, self-regulation will always be viewed with
some suspicion unless we are willing to admit that, even in
theory, a government of laws cann6t do everything.
unique from person to person. Thus, values and individual interpretations of
events are regarded as genuinely important. See, e.g., W. KOHLER, THE PLACE OF
VALUE IN A WORLD OF FACTS (1938). The problem with this view is that it tends to
be solplistic: it suggests that it is not possible to know whether other people think
as one does oneself.
There is a middle ground however. This school holds that rules do dictate be-
havior but that the rules can change (and indeed can change themselves). Such
thinking is central to work being done in artificial intelligence. See D. HOF-
STADTER, GODEL, ESCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID (1979). This school
may well be traceable to Kant. See H. ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND (1978).
In essence, this school of thought suggests that knowledge is very much like a
theory. If the theory explains enough one treats it as true; when it begins to falter
one develops a new theory. On balance such a philosophy of mind and behavior
leaves considerable room for self-regulation: while it assumes that in normal
times consensus is often possible, it also leaves room for continuous experimenta-
tion with new theories. Indeed, in a sense it requires such experimentation. In
any case, theorizing remains indeterminate and as such is best left to those closest
to the activity in question.
For some notable examples of the middle view, see T.S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962); L. WIrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGA-
TIONS (1953, Anscombe Trans.); B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL
STATE (1980); ARENDT, THE LIFE OF THE MIND (1978); D. C. DENNETr, CONTENT
AND CONSCIOUSNESS (1969); H. GARDNER, THE QUEST FOR MIND (1972) (summa-
rizing the work of the French Structuralists Jean Pigget and Claude Levi-Strauss).
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